











































Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi Derneği | International Relations Council of Turkey 
Uluslararası İlişkiler – Journal of International Relations 







Challenges of Demographic Pressures and Resource Scarcity 














To cite this article: Tür, Özlem, “Challenges of Demographic Pressures and Resource 
Scarcity on the Political Economy in the Levant & MENA Region”, Uluslararasi Iliskiler, Vol. 
15, No. 60, 2018, pp. 75-87, DOI: 10.33458/uidergisi.525099 
 
 
To link to this article: https://dx.doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.525099 
 
Submitted: 15 November 2017 


















All rights of this paper are reserved by the International Relations Council of Turkey. With the exception 
of academic quotations, no part of this publication may be reproduced, redistributed, sold or transmitted 
in any form and by any means for public usage without a prior permission from the copyright holder. 
Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the author(s)’s and do not reflect those of the 
Council, editors of the journal, and other authors. 
 
ULUSLARARASIiLiŞKiLER, Cilt 15, Sayı 60, 2018, s. 75-87 
Challenges of Demographic Pressures and Resource  
Scarcity on the Political Economy in the  
Levant & MENA Region 
Özlem TÜR
Professor, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.  
E-mail: tur@metu.edu.tr
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to analyze the challenges of population growth and resource scarcity in the Arab countries of the 
Levant. As the region has suffered from ongoing conflicts, civil wars, and political crises, the challenges of population 
growth and resource scarcity, coupled with environmental challenges has often been overlooked. This paper focuses 
on the problems associated with a growing population, such as an increased likelihood of unemployment and the 
emergence of a middle class poor in the region. Coupled with crony capitalism and patronage networks, it argues that 
the problems of youth are immediate and the necessity of inclusive policies is pressing. The paper follows by with a 
section that addresses environmental challenges and climate change. The linkage between environmental degradation 
and security is analyzed. The paper problematizes the Arab state, its regime survival strategies and its resistance to 
change as the main impediments for sustainability, growth and inclusiveness in the Levant. 
Keywords: Youth, Demographic Change, Climate Change, Crony Capitalism, Arab State.
Levant ve MENA Bölgesi Politik Ekonomisinde Demografik Baskılar ve 
Kaynak Kıtlığı Sorunları
ÖZET
Bu makale, Levant’taki Arap ülkelerinde yaşanan nüfus artışı ve kaynak kıtlığı sorunlarını analiz etmeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. Süregelen çatışmalar, iç savaşlar ve siyasi krizlerden mustarip olan bölgede, nüfus artışı, kaynak 
kıtlığı ve çevresel sorunlar genellikle görmezden gelinmektedir. Bu çalışma, bölgede nüfus artışıyla bağlantılı bir 
biçimde artan işsizlik ihtimali ve fakir bir orta sınıfın ortaya çıkması gibi sorunlara odaklanmaktadır. Kayırmacı 
kapitalizmin patronaj ağlarla birleştiği bir ortamda gençliğin sorunlarının acil biçimde çözümlenmesi gerektiği 
ve kapsayıcı politikalara duyulan ihtiyacın hayati olduğu savunulmaktadır. Çalışma çevresel sorunlar ve iklim 
değişikliğine de değinmektedir. Çevresel bozulma ve güvenlik arasındaki ilişki analiz edilmektedir. Makale, Arap 
devleti, rejim bekası stratejileri ve değişime dair direncin Levant’ta sürdürebilirlik, büyüme ve kapsayıcılığın 
önündeki en önemli engeller olduğunu sorunsallaştırmaktadır.




Back in 1995, Alan Richards warned us about an overemphasis on conflict and wars in the Middle 
East. While the region has undoubtedly witnessed many conflicts, interventions and civil strife, as 
Richards argues, “there is a quieter, deeper source of instability - mounting economic problems”. 
The Middle East has been falling behind other regions with its “inability to curb population growth”, 
which has produced a youth bulge, engendering “a rising tide of young people seeking jobs”. As the 
population increases, there is “a quietly increasing challenge to acquire adequate food”, thus the region 
“cannot feed itself; food dependency will grow in the near future, as the water constraint binds more 
tightly”. Richards further argues that, “there is a way out” and is rather straightforward as “technocrats 
know what to do”. Yet, the problem lies with the leaders/states as they “lack the will and the skill to pull 
it off. Weak political systems may well deliver ‘too little, too late.’ ”1
This paper aims to address these challenges — that of population growth and resource scarcity 
in the Levant and also adds the environmental challenges as a multiplying factor, and argues that 
despite many studies that call for immediate attention and action, the region suffers from a lack of 
political will in tackling these problems.2 Trying to grapple with hard security issues, bread and butter 
issues are often of secondary concern. Yet, as the human security concerns are neglected, the stability 
in the region is at higher risk.
When the Arab uprisings began in Tunisia and spread to Egypt and beyond by the end of 
2010, many analysts rushed to talk about population growth, unemployment, increasing food prices 
and the ensuing inequality in the region. One of the core discussions since then has been how the 
radical republics of the region, shaking up with demands for change are unable to respond to the 
growing challenges. The Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) of 2009 highlighted how the 
human security or lack of it in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region constituted an 
important watershed in these discussions.3  The report argued that “the trend in the region has been 
to focus more on the security of the state than on the security of the people” and called for a new 
approach that focused on the “human as the main agent”. In a way, as mentioned in the beginning of 
this paper, parallel to what Richards was arguing more than a decade ago, the report criticized the 
emphasis on the traditional conception of security and underlined that such an emphasis “led to 
missed opportunities to ensure the security of the human person”. Thus, what is faced in the region 
resulted in “an all-too-common sense of limited opportunities and personal insecurity, witnessed 
in the world’s highest levels of unemployment, deep and contentious patterns of exclusion”.4 As is 
underlined in the report, for decades the Arab citizen, suffered from seven dimensions of threat: 1) 
People and their insecure environment; 2) The State and its insecure people; 3) The vulnerability 
of those lost from sight; 4) Volatile growth, high unemployment and persisting poverty; 5) Hunger, 
malnutrition and food insecurity; 6) Health security challenges; and 7) Occupation and military 
interventions.5
1 Alan Richards, “Economic Roots of Instability in the Middle East”, Middle East Policy, Vol.4, No.1-2, 1995, p.175.
2 The paper mainly deals with the Arab countries of the Levant - Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Occupied Territories, and 
excludes a detailed analysis of Israel and Turkey.
3 Arab Human Development Report 2009 – Challenges for Human Security in the Arab Region, New York, UNDP, 2009.
4 Ibid., p.V.
5 Ibid, p.2-15.
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The inability to respond to these concerns thus lies at the heart of the uprisings. Yet, as will 
be argued below, why the uprisings happened at the moment they did, by the end of 2010, and not 
before has a great deal to do with the Arab state and its regime survival priorities. The demonstration 
of frustration among the young “middle class poor”, whose hopes for a better future were dashed due 
to the inability and unwillingness of the states to respond to these challenges for decades, is important 
to discuss in this context. As a demonstration of the importance of this fact, as will be discussed below, 
the AHDR of 2016 focuses on the youth population. Yet, to what extent the points underlined in the 
Report will be taken into account and will help the Arab states to overcome their survival priorities 
and act on the youth problems is altogether another question.
Demographic Pressure
The region hosts one of the fastest growing populations of the world. High fertility rates in the Arab 
world in general (six children per women in the 1980s) have produced a youth bulge between the 
ages of 15 and 24. One of the most striking characteristics of the MENA, no doubt, has been its 
rapid population growth. In four decades population numbers have more than quadrupled, rising 
from 124 million in 1970 and reaching 350 million. By 2050 the population of MENA is expected 
to reach around 600 million, 685 million in 2070 and 845 million in 2100 according to United 
Nations medium-fertility scenario. What is also important to note is that the share of the youth in 
the population in 2010 was 27.9 percent.6 The number of youth is expected to rise to 100 million 
by 2035.7 In the high-fertility scenario, MENA’s population is expected to double by 2080, which 
together with projected climate impacts, puts the resources of the region, especially water and 
land, under enormous pressure as it will be coupled with the high existing pressure to create new 
employment opportunities. 
R population growth is challenging enough for countries, but when the shares of certain 
population groups within states grow more rapidly than others, a so-called “differential fertility”, 
the issue becomes even more challenging. Most countries of the Levant are composed of critical 
minorities as well as limitations on certain groups’ access to political power. Changing population 
dynamics, one group growing more than the others, complicates the political and social dynamics. 
The Alawite minority in Syria, the Shi’a and the Kurds in Iraq, the secular/orthodox divide in Israel, 
rapid population growth in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as well as the population ratios of 
East Bankers in Jordan are critical. According to the recently released figures by the Israel Bureau of 
Statistics, there is “a massive rise in birth rates in the Jewish state.”8 Accordingly, 181,405 babies were 
born in Israel in 2016, showing “a 92 percent increase over the number of babies born in 1980. Of those 
babies, 73.9 percent were born to Jewish women, and 23.3 percent to Arab women.”9 Considering 
6 Arab Human Development Report 2016 – Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality, New York, 
UNDP, 2016, p.15 
7 Ragui Assaad and Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi, “Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Opportunity or 
Challenge”, Washington, Population Reference Bureau, April 2007, p.3. https://assets.prb.org/pdf07/YouthinMENA.
pdf, (Accessed on 8 March 2018).
8 “Israeli Birth Rates on the Rise”, Israel Today, 14 March 2018, http://www.israeltoday.co.il/NewsItem/tabid/178/




that the birth rate is higher especially among the ultra-Orthodox Jews, who have low participation 
in the work force, this stands as a divisive issue for the future of the society, as well as a constraint on 
economic growth.10  However challenging these population changes may be, none of these cases pose 
as important of a threat to stability as does the case of Lebanon. The confessional system established 
in Lebanon is based on the 1932 census, which determined the Maronite community as the majority.11 
Since then, although the population ratios are considered to have radically changed, no other census 
has been conducted. The Shi’a population has grown considerably and is thought to constitute a 
majority in the country, yet a parallel change in the system is not permitted.12 The emergence of the 
Amal movement in 1970s, as the Movement of the Dispossessed, was an attempt to change this, while 
the popularity of Hezbollah from 1980s is also related to this fact. In addition to general challenges 
that a growing population poses for the states, differential changes, when combined with lack of 
political opportunities and change, creates a suitable environment for more radical movements to 
grow, deepening the fragility of the state. When thinking about population growth, this aspect is also 
especially pressing for the Levant countries.
Growing Youth Bulge and Unemployment
As is often underlined, one of the most important characteristics of the region is its young 
population — that is the youth bulge — that constitutes the fastest growing segment of the 
Arab population.13 Around 60 percent of the population is considered to be less than 25 years of 
age, making the region one of the most youthful regions in the world, with a median age of 22 
years, compared to a global average of 28.5. As the UN Report of 2011 argued, although such 
a large number of youth “could become the backbone of strong economies and a vibrant future 
if they had the right education, skills, and job opportunities”, they are challenged with a lack 
of opportunities and high unemployment.14 In line with what Richards and Waterbury argue, 
population growth has “retarded the development process and stressed the polity” in the region.15 
One of the most important challenges, presented by the increasing population, is unemployment. 
According to International Labor Organization, youth unemployment is higher in the MENA 
region than in any other region of the world.16 While the world average for unemployment is six 
percent and the youth unemployment is 12.6 percent, the numbers reach 10.2 percent for total 
10 Tova Cohen, “Israel has the highest birth rate in the developed world, and that’s becoming a problem”, Reuters, 25 
September 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/israel-has-the-highest-birth-rate-in-the-developed-world-and-
thats-becoming-a-problem-2015-9, (Accessed on 7 February 2018).
11 For a discussion on the 1932 census and its significance see Rania Maktabi, “The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. 
Who are the Lebanese?”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.26, No.2, 1999, p.219-241.
12 For a discussion on the changing ratios of different sects, see William Harris, The New Face of Lebanon – History’s Revenge, 
Princeton, NJ, Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006, p.67-76.
13 For details see the United Nations Report by Farzaneh Roudi, Youth Population and Employment in the Middle 
East and North Africa: Opportunity or Challenge, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Adolescents, Youth 
and Development, July 2011, http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/egm-adolescents/p06_roudi.pdf, 
(Accessed on 30 January 2108).
14 Ibid.
15 Alan Richards and John Waterbury (Eds.), A Political Economy of the Middle East, 3rd ed., Boulder, Colorado, Westview 
Press, 2013, p.72.
16 International Labour Organization, “Global Employment Trends for Youth 2015 - MENA region retains highest youth 
unemployment rate in the world”, 8 October 2015, http://www.ilo.org/beirut/media-centre/news/WCMS_412797/
lang--en/index.htm, (Accessed on 30 January 2018). 
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unemployment and 27 percent for youth unemployment in the MENA and is highest among 
some of the Levant countries — Jordan, Lebanon and the Occupied Territories. As is presented 
in the table below, youth unemployment reaches 28 percent in Jordan and over 40 percent in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories.17 Rapid population growth requires states to “spend [more] 
money to create jobs”, and creating entry-level jobs becomes especially challenging. 
Table 1. Unemployment Rates in the MENA Region and the Levant Countries
Country Year Total Unemployment Youth Unemployment
World 2011 6 12.6
MENA 2011 10.2 27
Syria 2010 8.4 18.3
Lebanon 2007 9 22.1
Jordan 2010 12.5 28.1
Occupied Territories 2008 23.7 40.2
Source: Mirkin, “Arab Spring: Demographics in a Region in transition”, p. 23.
A look at the basic facts surrounding unemployment in the Levant — although there are 
differences between the countries — reveals four general and important aspects that are worth 
noting: First, unemployment is often greater in the cities than in the countryside; second, it mainly 
affects the youth; third, educated workers are more highly unemployed than uneducated ones; 
forth, unemployment rates for women exceed that of men.18 The young population requires long-
term investment in education and services before they can be economically productive, as well as 
a clean environment and sufficient resources to sustain them. As they complete their education (at 
different levels), the youth need jobs to sustain themselves and build families. Yet, this is not an 
easy task.
Asaf Bayat describes a “middle-class poor”19 to refer to the region’s educated youth and what 
Farhad Khosrokhavar calls a “would-be middle class”20 reflects this phenomenon. The region hosts 
an important youth population that is well educated, connected with the outside world, and uses 
social media very effectively, but have little chance of being the future elite. As the Arab Human 
Development Report of 2016 underlines, during the 2000s, the region witnessed the highest level of 
skilled emigration in the world; as young people cannot find jobs, they look for suitable conditions 
elsewhere.21 Those that stayed behind “being cut from the political and economic elite” faced a 
“constant feeling of anxiety” and frustration due to the lack of available qualified jobs. Despite 
being well educated, this group is mostly excluded from the labor market, political mechanisms 
and the countries’ ruling coalition mostly because of the ‘crony capitalism’ prevalent in most of 
17 Barry Mirkin, “Arab Spring Demographics in a Region in Transition”, Arab Human Development Report – Research Paper 
Series, New York,  UNDP, 2013, p.22-23.
18 Ibid.
19 Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2013. 
20 Farhad Khosrokhavar, The New Arab Revolutions That Shook the World, Boulder, London, Paradigm Publishers, 2012. 
21 Arab Human Development Report 2016, p.27
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these countries. The developmentalist state model based on import substitution industrialization, 
adopted by the radical republics during the 1950s and 1960s created an overgrown state sector in 
the ‘socialist’ Arab Republics. Crumbling under the need for economic reform in the 1980s, these 
countries, rather than pursuing a full-scale reform, chose to adopt “selective liberalizations” that 
would enlarge the ruling coalition rather than bring about any future change.22  Thus, the new elite 
who benefitted from the reforms were regime-friendly, loyal entrepreneurs that would serve the 
continuation of the regime and in return themselves. In this system, private investors who could 
link up with the state were presumably in a better position, making use of governmental licensing 
and often obtaining cheaper public sector inputs while supplying state-owned enterprises with 
‘favorably priced’ inputs.23 
There has been a strategic alliance between the state and this new elite as the “businessmen 
and bureaucrats have learned to manipulate economic policy to maximize personal benefit at the 
expense of national development”24 and the governments were “hostage to the politically primordial 
need to generate and disseminate patronage.”25 For example, in the case of Syria, Sadowski puts it 
bluntly: 
Corporate bonds are supposed to pursue profits, not popularity and politicians are supposed 
to increase the public welfare, not their bank accounts. Patronage tends to violate this 
separation: It is the most ‘economic’ of political relationships...It is the inequality not the 
inefficiency of patronage that offends Syrians. If everyone had equal access to patronage few 
would complain.26 
How Bashar Asad’s regime has modernized its authoritarian outlook by relying more on crony 
capitalists and how this has led to a more durable regime with long-term costs is a point underlined 
by Hinnebusch.27 As he emphasizes, at the heart of the regime coalition in Syria were “the ‘crony 
capitalists’, the rent-seeking alliances of political brokers (led by Asad’s mother’s family) and the 
regime supportive bourgeoisie”. By creating and nurturing its “own” capitalists, the Syrian regime 
aimed to “survive the incremental transition to a partial market economy and since no significant 
business venture was possible without regime insiders taking a percentage, regime crony capitalists 
developed intimate partnerships with wider elements of the bourgeoisie”.28 It is interesting to see 
that it was this bourgeoisie, and not the Ba’ath Party, that funded Asad’s 2007 re-election campaign. 
Although being more productive, the businessmen of Aleppo were less connected to the regime and 
therefore received less state benefit. How they managed to survive and triumph in this restrictive 
22 For this argument see Raymond Hinnebusch, “Syria: The Politics of Economic Liberalization”, Third World Quarterly, 
Vol.18, No.2, 1997, p.249-265; Steven Heydemann, “The Political Logic of Economic Rationality: selective stabilization in 
Syria”, H. J. Barkey (Ed.), The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1992, p.11-37.
23 Nazih Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, New York, I. B Tauris, 1995, p.345.
24 Yahya Sadowski, Political Vegetables? Businessmen and Bureaucrats in the: Development of Egyptian Agriculture, Washington, 
D.C., Brookings Institution, 1991.
25 Robert Springborg, “The Political Economy of the Arab Spring”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol.16, No.3, 2011, p.432.
26 Yahya Sadowski, “Baathists ethics and the Spirit of Satte Capitalism: Patronage and the Party in Contemporary Syria”, P. 
Chelkowski and R. J. Pranger (Eds.), Ideology and Power in the Middle East, Durhamand and London, Duke University 
Press, 1988, p.168-69.
27 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Syria: from ‘authoritarian upgrading’ to revolution?”, International Affairs, Vol.88 No.1, 2012, 
p.101-102.
28 Ibid.
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environment was thanks to the opening to Turkey. Other productive “medium-and small-scale capital 
was, however, marginalized and alienated.”29 
Without links to the state, the chances for businesses to survive are very small in the MENA 
region.  The countries of the Levant are no exception. In this context, when new jobs are created, 
they are often earmarked for the families of loyal businessmen, not for ordinary citizens. It was this 
cronyism, according to Cammett and Diwan, which lied at the core of the feelings of inequality and 
frustration that triggered the Arab uprisings.30
Youth Bulge, Social Instability and Conflict 
In addition to economic challenges and unemployment problems, the youth bulge in the Arab 
countries, the Levant region being no exception, is seen as one of the main drivers of social instability 
and conflict.31 But is there a direct linkage between population increase and security challenges? Do 
youth bulges create political violence and social conflict? Although this question has been discussed 
in the literature for long time, it has come back to the forefront since the Arab uprisings.  
Moller, back in 1968, argued that the presence of a large number of adolescents and young 
adults is likely to influence the political affairs so as to generate violent conflicts.32 There is a cause 
and effect relationship between such an increase and political instability. Mesquida and Weiner argue 
that it is particularly young men who engage in collective risk taking. The relative number of young 
males in a given population is likely to influence political affairs and to lead to collective violence. 
A population profile that is disproportionately young makes the occurrence of political violence 
extremely probable. Their conclusion is that the presence of a relatively large number of men makes 
coalitional aggression more probable, particularly when the resources needed to attract a mate are 
insufficiently available or poorly distributed.33
Stuck in between the lack of jobs and crony capitalists, the MENA youth have little hope for 
their future. It was this combination of a youth bulge, high employment and the feeling of frustration 
that moved young people to the streets in 2010/11. Their high education and social media networks 
made them highly equipped for the job market; yet their hopes for the future were limited. Although 
unemployment was high, economic growth was slow, and food prices were high, these were not new 
dynamics and had been present in the region for the past few decades. What explains the uprisings 
in this particular moment cannot be understood without the accumulated frustration based on a 
combination of economic factors as well as the closed regime coalitions.  
29 Ibid.
30 Melani Cammett and Ishac Diwan, “Conclusion: The Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings”, Richards and Waterbury, 
A Political Economy of the Middle East, p.414.
31 For a general analysis that looks at the relationship between population growth and security see, Jack A. Goldstone, 
“Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict”, Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol.56, No.1, Fall 2002, p.3-22. 
32 Herbert Moller, “Youth as a Force in the Modern World”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.10, No.3, 1968, 
p.237-260.
33 Christian G. Mesquida and Neil I. Wiener, “Human Collective Aggression: A behavioral ecology perspective”, Ethology 
and Sociobiology, Vol.17, No.4, July 1996, p.247-262.
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Is There a Way Out for the Youth?
The Arab Human Development Report of 2016, titled Youth and the Prospects for Human Development 
in a Changing Reality, propose a way out of the demographic pressure the region is experiencing. 
The report makes three important recommendations: “To enhance the basic capabilities of young 
people to allow them to realize their full potential”; “to widen the opportunities available to young 
people for self-fulfillment by providing suitable job opportunities, [...] enabling them to participate 
actively in government and public institutions”; and “to achieve peace and security and strengthen 
the role of youth.”34 The last objective seems the most improbable, as the region is in a constant 
state of conflict and the imminent danger of war is very high. The other two objectives do not 
seem adoptable in the short-term either, though the urgency is very clear considering the rapid 
population growth. 
Although these recommendations call for states to make the necessary changes, in the Arab 
world in general “the state” with its regime survival reflexes seems to create more problems than 
solutions for the youth. Despite the existing challenges for the youth in the region, the adaptation 
of national youth policies or strategies is limited. Slow progress on the matter is due to problems in 
implementation, both because there are coordination problems between the institutions that are 
involved in youth policies and because there is an unwillingness to work with the youth in policy-
making processes. More clearly, the authoritarian nature of the state prevents any transparent, inclusive 
mechanisms of policy formulation; thus while maintaining the stability and security of the regime in 
the short-run, in the medium to long run will create greater risks and problems.
Growing Population and Resource Scarcity 
As the population of the region rapidly increases, a scarcity of resources also becomes an important 
problem. One of the most urgent scarcities in the region is water, which also affects food security. 
The MENA region in general is an arid region with low precipitation rates. The 1990s often referred 
to the possibility of ‘water wars’ in the region, signaling the importance of the issue.35 Considering 
the environmental problems caused by climate change, the amount of water in the Levant has been 
declining in recent years. Droughts, which dramatically affected Northern Syria and Iraq at the end 
of the 2000s, and which will be discussed below, are important to note. Considering the severity of 
the water scarcity, Richards and Waterbury call for a change of direction in economic activity for the 
region. They suggest rather a difficult road ahead: non-agricultural development.36 Transforming 
the pre-dominantly agrarian Arab economies – especially those of the Levant – to non-agricultural 
development is not an easy task. The not-so-successful efforts of state-led industrialization/
developmentalism of the 1950s and 1960s are telling in this case. 
Another possibility to cope with water scarcity can be finding ways of cooperation with 
neighbors. In a highly securitized environment, such mechanisms might be expected to help alleviate 
if not end the political tension in the region. But, looking at the question of how much cooperation 
34 Arab Human Development Report, 2016, p.40-41.
35 See for example Joyce R. Starr, “Water Wars”, Foreign Policy, No.82, Spring 1991, p.17-36. 
36 Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p.176-177.
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can be achieved in sharing the permanent rivers, which are the main source of surface water, little 
success has been achieved so far. As Stang suggests, as with other issues, the Levant has little success 
in term of cooperation in environmental issues. Although it has more geographic opportunities to 
“pursue environmental cooperation than other sub-regions of the MENA with the shared waters of 
Jordan, Tigris and Euphrates basins crossing the borders”, there is little possibility of cooperation, as 
the regional conflict overrides attempts for collaboration in the Levant.37
Although ending up in failure, there had been a couple of initiatives. For example, the 1994 
Israel-Jordan Peace Agreement led to the establishment of a Joint Water Committee that would help 
parties to share water, build infrastructure and provide for joint project development. The cooperation 
continued for over twenty years, but it has been highly politicized and the “decisions are often dictated 
by Israel”.38 The Euphrates-Tigris Basin has also witnessed competition rather than cooperation. The 
water issue has been highly politicized, especially between Turkey and Syria in the 1990s and has 
been linked to bilateral security problems.39 In the 2000s, although the two countries have managed 
to see the water issue more as a technical one, and managed to cooperate on water sharing, this period 
did not produce any agreements. As the Turkish-Syrian relations strained after the beginning of the 
uprisings in Syria, water cooperation also vanished. This is a good example for demonstrating how 
water issues are subject to political agenda and thus high politics.
Growing Population and Food Security
The Middle East region in general, being one of the top food importers in the world, is extremely 
vulnerable to food supplies and prices. The region in general is suffering from deficits in bio-capacity 
and agricultural production.40 As the global crop production declined in 2010, commodity prices 
jumped in the region. There is already some analysis that underlines how food security and the 
high food prices are one of the major factors that sparked the Arab uprisings.41 With other socio-
economic challenges, this is surely one of the factors that added to the frustration of the masses with 
their current regimes. However, although the issue is central for a population’s livelihood, policies 
oriented towards food security do not seem to be prioritized by the governments. In the words of 
the former Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State, Ann Marie Slaughter, the 
discussion on food security lacks two qualities necessary to be taken seriously: “it is not immediate 
and it is not sexy.”42 Yet, food security is actually immediate. Considering the volatility of food 
imports, most Middle East countries are trying to achieve food sufficiency. But without available 
resources some are now directing their energies to acquire land abroad. For example, Jordan and 
37 Gerald Stang, “Climate Challenges in the Middle East – Rethinking Environmental Cooperation”, Middle East Institute 
Policy Paper, Washington D.C, 2016-2, p.9.
38 Ibid., p.11.
39 Mustafa Aydın and Fulya Ereker, “Water Scarcity and Political Wrangling: Security in the Euphrates and Tigris Basin”, 
Hans Günter Brauch et.al. (Eds.), Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and 
Water Security Concepts, Berlin & New York, Springer, 2009, p.603-613.
40 John Waterbury, “The Political Economy of Climate Change in the Arab World”, Arab Human Development Report 
Research Paper Series, New York, UNDP, 2013, p.35.
41 For example see, Ines Perez “Climate Change and Rising Food Prices Heightened Arab Spring”,  ClimateWire, 4 March 
2013, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/climate-change-and-rising-food-prices-heightened-arab-spring/ 




Turkey joined in a group of Gulf countries to buy land in Sudan.43 Although Turkey ranks 49th and 
Jordan 55th in the food security index among the 113 countries in the list,44 their rush to buy/lease 
land abroad can be seen as an attempt to meet the challenge ahead. The others are not lucky or 
prepared as much. Thus, coupled with environmental constraints, food security will be a serious 
challenge ahead for the countries of the Levant.
Environmental Challenges – Resource scarcity and  
Security Concerns
As is discussed above, the region is highly stressed by the challenges posed by a growing population. As 
the competition to share resources increases, environmental degradation and climate change is putting 
additional stress on these resources. As has been often argued, in the Middle East in general, there is a 
“long-term mismanagement of natural resources.”45 The aggregation of this neglect, coupled with the 
recent challenges of environmental degradation and climate change, could “make the parts of the MENA 
region”, including parts of the Levant, “uninhabitable”.46 As is often reported, most Arab countries have 
contributed very little to the greenhouse effect. For example, the MENA’s share of carbon dioxide 
emissions is no more than 4.7 per cent, lower than any other region except Sub-Saharan Africa.47 Despite 
this, the region will be directly affected from climate change in terms of water scarcity and thus faces a 
decrease in agricultural production, higher levels of emigration, lower levels of economic production, 
deepened food insecurity, increased poverty and a higher risk of social instability.48 Yet, as in other issues, 
Waterbury argues that when dealing with environmental challenges “going through the motions or doing 
nothing is a viable political strategy and may be attractive unless there are sufficient incentives, mainly 
economic and financial, to induce real commitments to adaptation”.49
There have been a couple of initiatives that problematized the environmental issues in the 
Levant. The Middle East Environmental Security Initiative, which brought Jordan, Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority together, has been important in providing for a forum for regional cooperation.50 
Beginning its activities in 1997, it brought key issues, such as renewable energy and a need for regional 
43 Waterbury, “The Political Economy of Climate Change in the Arab World”, p.36; “Türkiye Sudan’da tarım arazisi 
kiraladı” (Turkey Leased Agricultural Land in Sudan), TRT Haber, 13 May 2014, http://www.trthaber.com/haber/
ekonomi/turkiye-sudanda-tarim-arazisi-kiraladi-127324.html, (Accessed on 30 January 2018). 
44 Global Food Security Index, http://foodsecurityindex.eiu.com, (Accessed on 1 February 2018).
45 Francesca De Chatel, “The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising – Untangling the Triggers of the 
Revolution, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.50, No.4, 2014, p.521-535.
46 Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, “Climate change could make parts of the Middle East and North Africa ‘uninhabitable’”, 
Independent, 3 May 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/climate-change-could-make-parts-of-the-
middle-east-and-north-africa-uninhabitable-a7010811.html, (Accessed on 30 January 2018).
47 Human Development Report 2007/2008 – Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, New York, 
UNDP, 2007.
48 For details see Oli Brown and Alec Crawford, Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions-Climate Change and the Risk of Violent 
Conflict in the Middle East, Manitoba, Canada, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2009.
49 Waterbury, “The Political Economy of Climate Change in the Arab World”, p.24.
50 Hans Günter Brauch, “Environment and Security in the Middle East: Conceptualizing Environmental, Human, Food, 
Health and Gender Security”, C. Lipchin et al. (Eds.), Integrated Water Resources Management and Security in the Middle 
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dialogue to the agenda.51 Also, there are various non-state initiatives run by the NGOs, two of which 
especially stand out: The Israeli-Palestine Center for Research and Information (ICPRI), established 
in 1988 and renamed Israel-Palestine: Creative Regional Initiatives in 2003,52 and EcoPeace/Friends 
of the Earth in the Middle East, which works on the environmental impact of conflicts/wars in the 
region. The IPCRI declares that a large part of its “peace-building work focuses on the environment”. It 
looks at the impact of “environmental degradation on Israel and Palestine, developing environmentally 
conscious infrastructure in West Bank and Gaza and promoting the economic benefits of cooperation 
between Israel and Palestine”.53 EcoPeace, on the other hand, established in 1994, has offices in 
Amman, Bethlehem and Tel Aviv, and works on the “promotion of cooperative efforts to protect” 
the “shared environmental heritage” of the region.54 Considering that the region is prone to conflict 
and has experienced a high frequency of wars, demonstrating the environmental impact of conflict 
is significant. Yet, again such concerns often yield to high politics and strategic priorities and do not 
produce tangible results on the ground. 
Global warming in general severely affects the region. But, like in other aspects, climate 
change is “too nebulous and long term and even seemingly hypothetical to be a priority for most 
people…Doing nothing has proven the easy option”.55 Warming of about 0.2 degrees per decade 
has been observed in the MENA region from 1961 to 1990, and at an even faster rate since then.56 
Studies show that by the end of the century, “unusual heat extremes will occur in about 30 percent 
of summer months almost everywhere in the MENA region”.57  Living in certain places in the region 
will be impossible, and will create huge migration waves within and from the region. Many studies 
underline a direct linkage between climate change and migration.58 Internal migration will continue 
to be important, as many people will be forced to move, while others — the poor — will have to stay 
back. In such a context, it is not only enough to talk about the migration as a consequence of climate 
change, but it is also necessary to talk about how to gauge climate change in relation to other economic 
and political conditions that might foster or limit migration. Another important question centers on 
how MENA governments plan to address the coming climate-motivated migration waves. 
Is there a direct linkage between climate change and security? By creating competition for scarce 
resources, intensifying food insecurity and hindering economic growth, climate change is considered 
to be a cause for many security concerns.59 The linkage between migration as a consequence of climate 
change and conflicts is often underlined. When the Arab uprisings reached Syria, many studies 
rushed to note that a main cause of the uprising might be related to the severe drought the country 
51 Ibid.
52 See http://www.ipcri.org/index.php/about, (Accessed on 30 March 2018).
53 Ibid.
54 For objectives and history of the Organization http://ecopeaceme.org/, (Accessed on 30 March 2018).
55 Stang, Climate Challenges in the Middle East, p.4.
56 Katharina  Waha et.al, “Climate change impacts in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region and their 
implications for vulnerable population groups”, Regional Environmental Change, Vol.17, No.6, August 2017, p.1623-1638.
57 Ibid.
58 For example see, Clionadh Raleigh, Lisa Jordan and Idean Salehyan, “Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on 
Migration and Conflict”, World Bank Group for the Social Dimensions of Climate Change, http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/SDCCWorkingPaper_MigrationandConflict.pdf 
(Accessed on 30 January 2018).
59 Brown and Crawford, Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions, p.2-3.
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experienced between 2006-2010, which led to a huge migration wave.60 In 2009, more than 800,000 
Syrians were reported to have lost their livelihoods due to the drought in northern Syria.61  Migrants 
to Der’a from northern Syria were considered by some analysts to have been a driver of the uprising. 
But research done by Fröhlich shows that this was not the case. Migrants from northern Syria were too 
weak and not established in Der’a and thus incapable of organizing the community towards collective 
action.62 Rather than establishing a direct causality, it is possible to argue that ‘climate migration’ can 
act “as a threat multiplier” in the region “by placing additional pressure on already scarce resources 
and by reinforcing preexisting threats such as political instability, poverty and unemployment”.63 
Chatel emphasizes the role of the Syrian state during the drought period and argues that it was not 
the drought, “but rather the government’s failure to respond to the ensuing humanitarian crisis that 
formed one of the triggers of the uprising, feeding a discontent that had long been simmering in rural 
areas.”64 While Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine were also affected by drought in 2007-2008, 
Chatel explains that the humanitarian crisis emerged in Syria and not in any other Levantine countries 
due to the government’s long-term neglect of the rural areas and need for reform and decades of 
accumulated mismanagement. How the state created the crisis situation and later handled (or did 
not handle it) is what is critical. The policies of the Syrian government have depleted the North of its 
resources and the drought only added further devastation to an already critical situation. Blaming the 
uprising solely on climate change would mean taking responsibility off the state. The state is the most 
important actor and is required to act but chooses not to, complicating the problem and creating grave 
consequences.
Conclusion
This paper argued that the Levant is facing enormous challenges due to a youth bulge and resource 
scarcity. The rising population, environmental challenges and climate change are all putting a 
strain on the region’s already scarce resources. Considering that the region is witnessing a rapidly 
growing youth population, the ensuing unemployment, cronyism, labor-seeking emigration and 
increasing likelihood of drought will continue to be challenges in future decades. As it is underlined 
above, societies with growing young populations face both opportunities and challenges. There is 
a potential of dynamism and growth. Yet on the other hand there exists a high risk for instability if 
the demands for the youth cannot be met. Despite different levels of development, the countries of 
the Levant share similar challenges when faced with the need to meet the demands of their growing 
populations. 
60 For example see, Henry Fountain, “Researchers Link Syrian Conflict to a Drought Made Worse by Climate Change”, 
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drought-caused-by-climate-change.html (Accessed on 30 January 2018).
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2012/02/29/syria-climate-change-drought-and-social-unrest (Accessed on 30 January 2018).
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As shown, the need to address the requirements is pressing but, despite the severity of the 
picture and demand for new policies, the states are mostly occupied with hard security issues and are 
struggling with civil wars, violent non-state actors, and sectarian politics. In almost every country of 
the Levant there is either an ongoing conflict or a danger of its eruption. While the Palestinian issue 
still lies at the heart of regional politics, the devastating civil war in Syria brought in different regional 
and international actors, making all its neighbors — Iraq, Turkey, Jordan and Israel — a part of the 
crisis to different degrees. In the context of ongoing crises, population issues and resource scarcity 
are easily neglected. The states also use high politics as a way to justify inaction and thus continue to 
prioritize regime security and cronyism. 
Also the presence of imminent danger of war inhibits cooperation between parties. Considering 
that the effects of environmental problems and resource scarcity can best be mitigated through 
cooperation, the Levant seems to be far from witnessing any change in this aspect. Yet, it is the issues 
of population, environment and resources that will determine the future of the regimes of the Levant. 
Considering how these issues are linked to security, without providing basic level of human security, 
the risk of future instability is very high. How to persuade the unwilling leaders to take action seems 
to be the hardest task.
